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Session 9
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
The George Washington University Law School
David J. Berteau
Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington D.C.

I.

CRISIS, OR KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE STREET?

A. Sequestration and the Fiscal Cliff: January 2, 2013, and Beyond. The (dominant, inescapable) emerging issue in government contracting, looking ahead, is the money (or lack of it). As the
fiscal belt tightens, the procurement landscape – what the government buys, from whom, and how –
will necessarily change. Much of 2012 was spent anticipating some dramatic, difficult decision-making
which, apparently, will now be further delayed. While a worst case scenario may have been avoided
with a New Year’s deal, nothing suggests that the major underlying structural concerns have been
addressed. In other words, the can may have been kicked down the street, but neither the uncertainty
nor the anxiety surrounding acquisition forecasting has been in any way diminished.
B. But What Have We Learned? Of course, that does not mean there is nothing to discuss –
innumerable interesting issues remain unresolved. See,e .g., Mary Beth Bosco, Feature Comment:
“Sequestration—What It Means, Will It Happen, What To Do If You Are A DOD Contractor,” 54 GC ¶
239; 54 GC ¶ 244(e); Robert H. Koehler, Feature Comment: Can Contractors Rely On OMB’s WARN
Act ‘Guidance’?, 54 GC ¶ 335; Nonprofit Report Suggests DOD Sequestration Cuts Are Doable, 54 GC
¶ 350 (“task force report from the Center for American Progress … suggests that the cuts to the [DoD]
budget mandated by sequestration and the Budget Control Act of 2011 … are ‘readily achievable with
no sacrifice to our security – if the cuts are done in a thoughtful manner over the next decade.’”), see
also Rebalancing Our National Security: The Benefits of Implementing a Unified Security Budget,
available at www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/UnifiedSecurityBudget.pdf;
Groups Urge Sequestration Action, Highlight Risks, 54 GC ¶ 338(c); House Committee Wants OMB
Communications on Sequestration, 54 GC ¶ 322(d); OMB Memo Reiterates DOL WARN Act Sequestration Guidance, Clarifies Cost Liability, 54 GC ¶ 315, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-19.pdf; White House Gives Sequestration Report to Congress, 54 GC
¶ 288(c); see also, President Signs Sequestration Transparency Act, 54 GC ¶ 250; President Exempts
Troops from Sequestration, 54 GC ¶ 244(e); Sequestration Transparency Bill Goes To President, DOL
Issues WARN Act Guidance, 54 GC ¶ 236; Contractors, Industry Warn Of Sequestration Risks, 54 GC ¶
223; Sequestration Debate Continues, Impasse Looms, 54 GC ¶ 213; Senators Call For Action To Avert
Sequestration, 54 GC ¶ 206; Deputy Defense Secretary, House Intel Chair Oppose Sequestration, 54 GC
¶ 179; White House Memo Provides Inside Look At Government Shutdown Preparations, 54 GC ¶ 3;
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/ m-12-03.pdf; David J. Berteau &
Ryan Crotty, Super Committee Fallout and the Implications for Defense, available at http://csis.org.
Rather, it means that – at this point – we have few, if any, answers to the most important questions
regarding the future of federal public procurement. So, stay tuned.
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II.

FINALLY? THE END OF THE POST-MILLENIUM Procurement Spending BINGE

A. The New Economic Reality? Regular attendees of this conference
are familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the post-millennium federal
procurement spending trend. Readers also recognize that, while federal
procurement spending was always significant, it wasn’t always this significant. In Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to just
over $223 billion. The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18
and 20 percent spending increases. More recently, in 2011, we witnessed
a fourth consecutive fiscal year in which federal procurement spending
exceeded $535 billion.
Using adjusted figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data
System (FPDS) and USASpending.gov, history is consistently being rewritten), it appears that the annual increases in federal procurement
– from 2001 through 2008 – were never less than three times the rate
of inflation. The experts correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would taper; in 2009, the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally
stalled. Yet, in retrospect, the dire warnings that the current spending
binge was a blip – and that procurement spending would promptly retract
– were unfounded.
Now, after years of waiting, we see the first empirical evidence that
the procurement spending growth cycle finally has run its course. But the
news is not all bad for contractors. The $500+ billion plateau represents
the high-end of a robust and sustained growth curve. Now, only time will
tell how far the reductions go and whether they can be sustained.
Federal Procurement Spending
2001–2012*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement
Spending (in Billions
of Dollars)

Percentage Increase
or (Decrease) From
Previous Year

Percentage Increase or
(Decrease) in Consumer
Price Index (CPI)

2012

$514*

(~3-4)

1.8*

2011

$537.3 ($535.1) †

(~1)

3.2

2010

$538.6 ($537.7)

(~1)

1.6

2009

$540.6 ($541.3)

(~0)

(0.4)

2008

$541.0 ($541.8)

13.9

3.8

2007

$469.0 ($475.3)

10.5

2.8

2006

$432.0

9.8

3.2

2005

$391.3 ($391.2)

13.1

3.4

2004

$346.4

8.8

2.7

2003

$318.1 ($318.3)

20.6

2.3

2002

$263.4

18.0

1.6

2001

$223.1

*FY 2012 figures reflects only an estimate based upon preliminary reporting and the
OMB memo, referenced below.
† Dollar figures in parentheses reflect last year’s reported numbers. Other parentheticals reflect negative numbers.
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual
Detailed Report Tables and the Table Containing History of CPI-U U.S.
All Items Indexes and Annual Percent Changes From 1913 to Present,
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://
www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables.
B. Good News or Strange Misinformation? Late in the calendar
year, the White House embarked on a surprising campaign trumpeting
the dramatic savings that its policies have wrung out of the previously
inefficient and bloated acquisition regime. The story line sounds great,
but it appears dubious upon closer examination. Here’s the administration’s good news graphic, and an excerpt from the announcement follows:

Since the beginning of the Administration, President Obama has
challenged Federal agencies to strengthen their acquisition and
contracting practices by eliminating inefficiencies and buying
smarter. In response, agencies have cut unnecessary contracts
and launched new efforts to pool the government’s buying power
to deliver a better value for the American people.
These efforts are paying off. The Administration reduced
contract spending by over $20 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012
compared to last year. This reduction is the largest single year
dollar decrease in Federal contract spending on record, and
establishes a three-year downward trend from 2009-2012....
This progress is remarkable, and we are pleased that we have
not only stemmed but reversed the unsustainable growth in
contracting under the previous Administration....
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Joe Jordan, Historic Savings in Contracting – and Plans for More, OMB
Blog (December 6, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2012/12/06/historic-savings-contracting-and-plans-more.
This strikes us a slightly overblown and, frankly, somewhere between
deceptive and disingenuous. Our antennae rise when – on a second reading
– recognition dawns that the neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are mentioned
in this spending trend success story. That seems like a rather dramatic
omission. We think there might be more to the story, and we recommend
consulting, for example, Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Congressional Research
Service Report RL33110 (March 29, 2011)(emphasis added), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf, which explains, among
other things:
• [As of last year,] the cumulative total appropriated from the
9/11 for those war operations, diplomatic operations, and medical
care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans [wa]s $1.283 trillion
including[, among other things]: $806 billion for Iraq; $444
billion for Afghanistan; and $29 billion for enhanced security….
• 94% of this funding goes to the Department of Defense (DOD)
to cover primarily incremental war-related costs, that is, costs
that are in addition to DOD’s normal peacetime activities….
(Emphasis in original.)
• Total war funding for Iraq rose sharply … in the fall of 2002
to $53 billion in the invasion year of 2003, almost trebling to
$131 billion in FY2007, and peaking at $142 billion during the
surge in FY2008. ... With the … withdrawal plan …, total war
costs for Iraq have begun to decline, dropping to $96 billion in
FY2009 to $66 billion in FY2010 and $51 billion in FY2011
when troop levels drop to 43,000. In FY2012, costs are likely to
be substantially less once the U.S. withdrawal is completed....
- Much of the large increases between FY2006 and
FY2008 was due to higher procurement funding, that,
in turn, reflects primarily an expansive definition adopted by
the Bush Administration of the amounts needed to reset or
reconstitute units returning from deployments, that included
not only repairing and replacing war damaged equipment
but also upgrading equipment to meet future needs for the
“long war on terror”....
• After hovering around $15 billion in FY2003 and FY2004,
total war costs for Afghanistan grew to about $20 billion in
FY2005 and FY2006…. Funding then doubled to $39 billion in
FY2007, and $44 billion in FY2008, as troop levels increased
… and the intensity of conflict grew…. Since then, costs have
increased sharply to $60 billion in FY2009, and $105 billion
in FY2010 assuming the pending supplemental is approved,
and $119 billion in the FY2011 request. ... Future costs in
Afghanistan remain uncertain as it is not clear at what pace
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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U.S. troops may withdraw starting in June 2011 or how long U.S.
involvement will persist.

C. Slicing and Dicing the Data at DOD. We continue to be interested in more sophisticated data that provides better, more accessible
insights into how the federal government’s procurement dollars are spent.
A number of additional reports and studies build upon data we have previously reported. See, e.g., Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for
Strategic & International Studies, U.S. Department of Defense Contract
Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base (September 2012), and U.S.
Department of Defense Service Contract Spending and the Supporting
Industrial Base, 2000-2011 (May 17, 2012), available at www.csis.org/
diig; see also, DOD Contract Data Show Industrial Base Trends, 54 GC ¶
292; DOD Competes More Services Contracts Than Contracts For Goods,
54 GC ¶ 94. Some highlights from these data rich resources include:
•

Between 2001 and 2011:
- dollars obligated to contract awards by DoD more than
doubled,
- contract spending outpaced growth in other DoD outlays;
and
- the growth in products and services experienced a 21-year
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.4 percent and
9.4 percent, respectively, compared to 5.4 percent annual
growth in R&D.

•

From 2008 to 2011, there was a profound shift in DoD contract
spending.
- absolute obligations for services contracts declined by $25
billion and dropped from 64 percent of total DoD acquisition
outlays to 55 percent, and
- noncontract defense spending increased by $71 billion and
increased from 36 percent of DoD acquisition outlays to 45
percent.

•

Stability? There was no significant change in overall DoD contract spending between 2010 and 2011, suggesting a possible
equilibrium in the ratio between DoD contracts spending and
other spending has been reached. (Such a steady relationship
for DoD spending, split between contracts and other accounts,
has not been seen since the years 1995 to 2001.) Anticipated
reductions in defense spending, however, likely will affect future
DoD outlays.

•

In 2011, DoD spending on service contract actions totaled $198
billion, accounting for slightly under 30 percent of total DoD
outlays and 56 percent of total DoD contract spending for the
year (up from 50 percent the year before and 48 percent in
2000).

•

For much of the past decade, the Army was the primary driver
of growth in DoD’s service contract spending, increasing at an
average of 8.9 percent per year for the period. After reaching
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a peak of $89 billion in 2009, Army service contract spending
decreased substantially to $76 billion in 2011, largely as a result
of the U.S. force drawdown in Iraq. For the past three years,
the Army’s spending on service contracts has declined by 2.5
percent per year.
•

During the recent years of defense drawdowns (2008-2011),
DoD services contract spending decreased by some $18 billion
(a 9 percent decline) while spending on products decreased by
$26 billion (almost 13 percent).

•

The highest growth rate in spending on services occurred
in the “Other” category (the main elements of which are the
Defense Logistics Agency and the Missile Defense Agency),
which grew from $9 billion to $36 billion between 2000 and
2011. Unlike the key military departments, the “Other” category expanded after 2009, from $32 billion in 2010 to $36
billion in 2011.

•

Between 2009 and 2011, the total value of fixed-price contracts for defense services rose 6 percent, while that of costreimbursement contracts grew more than 13 percent. Time
and materials contracts dropped in combined value by almost
38 percent.

•

The makeup of the top 7 defense service contractors has been
stable, with the only differences between 2000 and 2011 being
the disappearance of TRW (acquired by Northrop Grumman)
and the entry of L3 into 7th place in 2011.

-

More significant upheaval occurred within the rest of the top
20, with eight newcomers compared to 2000, including three
health care service providers: Humana, TriWest Healthcare,
and Health Net.

-

Mergers and acquisitions also played a role as Northrop Grumman acquired three of the top 20 contractors from 2000: TRW,
Litton, and Newport News Shipbuilding.

D. More Insight at the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). In a separate report, CSIS developed a prior data set for the
DHS, tracking trends for 2004-2011 (with the disclaimer that 2002-2003
mainly reflected DHS start-up costs). Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group,
Center for Strategic & International Studies, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base,
2004–2011 (November, 2012), available at http://csis.org; DHS Services
Contracting Trending Down, But Still Significant, CSIS Finds, 54 GC ¶
370. CSIS found that DHS’s contract spending was relatively stable, with
the most fluctuation in FEMA following major disasters. Some interesting
observations include:

© 2013 Thomson Reuters

•

Contract obligations were stable between 2010 and 2011, indicating that DHS was spared from the effects of current budget
drawdowns;

•

DHS experienced a decline in contracts for services, obligations
for which have declined by over a billion dollars since 2009; and
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•

Contract obligations for products, largely stagnant for the
second half of the last decade, increased dramatically in 2011,
due almost entirely to Coast Guard contracts;

•

While only about half of DHS contract dollars were obligated
as a result of competitions that received multiple offers, the
amount of dollars obligated via competition increased steadily,
particularly in post-Katrina years, while those that were obligated with no competition decreased;

•

Since 2007, there has been a rise in DHS fixed-price contracts
and a relative decline in cost-reimbursement contracts; and

•

As DHS priority missions shifted from disaster relief and
cleanup to building technology-intensive capabilities, so did
the composition of DHS’ largest contractors. Between 2006 and
2011, engineering and construction firms were overtaken by
IT and consulting firms (including Computer Sciences Corp.,
IBM, Lockheed Martin, and SAIC).

E. And Peeking Behind the Curtain at the Department of State
and the Agency for International Development (AID). CSIS also
provided additional insight into procurement spending at State and AID.
Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic & International
Studies, Contract Spending by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (June 2012)), available at www.csis.org/diig.
•

Services dominated procurement spending, increasing from
$1.7 billion in 2000, to $11.4 billion in 2011, an increase of
575 percent. As a percent of procurement spending, services
accounted for 73 to 91 percent during this period.
- During the 2000-2011 period, the largest category of services
was professional, administrative, and management (PAMS),
accounting for approximately $53 billion. PAMS purchasing
increased from $800 million to $5.8 billion (or 605 percent)
over 11 years, peaking between 2006 and 2010, during which
it accounted for more than 54 percent of AID’s and State’s
procurement spending.

•

Product or supply purchasing accounted for more than a quarter of AID and State spending in 2000-2001, but decreased to
between 8 and 15 percent during the 2002 to 2011 timeframe.

•

State and AID contracting has become increasingly competitive. Except for 2006, the majority (between 52 and 68 percent)
of contract actions were awarded each year on a competitive
basis after receiving multiple offers.
- The total value of competitively awarded contracts with
multiple offers increased by 9.4 percent between 2008 and
2011.
- During the same period, however, the total dollars awarded
competitively after a single offer was received increased by
24 percent per year.
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F. A Reminder on Grants: Follow The Money. Despite all of the
attention focused upon government contracting, grant spending continues to outpace procurement spending. Consistent with the trend we’ve
previously reported, grant spending exceeded procurement spending last
year, as it has for ten of the last twelve years. We continue to hope that,
eventually, the oversight and regulatory community shifts its focus from
procurement to grants. If the government is serious about reducing its
debts and its annual deficits, this seems unavoidable.
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending
2001–2012*
Fiscal Year

Procurement Spending (in
Billions)

Grant Spending
(in Billions)

2012

$514*

$531.5*

2011

$537.3

$566.3

2010

$538.6

$613.8

2009

$540.6

$664.9

2008

$541.0

$419.5

2007

$469.0

$430.1

2006

$432.0

$490.0

2005

$391.3

$441.7

2004

$346.4

$450.1

2003

$318.3

$493.7

2002

$263.4

$406.3

2001

$223.1

$330.8

*FY 2012 figures reflects only an estimate based upon preliminary reporting and
the OMB memo, referenced above.

Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov.
III. THE ONGOING DEBATE: QUANTIFYING AND
QUALIFYING THE Outsourcing-INSOURCING CONVERSATION
On the one hand, little changed in the contentious philosophical battleground of outsourcing and insourcing. Still, we continue to believe that the
use of data may prove more meaningful than emphatic, ideological rhetoric
(particularly if not backed up with meaningful information). We remain
skeptical of the validity of service contract inventories (artificially tied to
FTE’s) or apples-to-oranges cost comparisons, and fear that bad (or inaccurate) information will be used to support ill-conceived positions. Great
opportunities for chicanery exist. See, generally, Agency Services Contract
Inventories Incomplete, Improving, 54 GC ¶ 313 (“Civilian agencies did not
fully comply with statutory requirements for compiling fiscal year 2011
services contract inventories”); Civilian Service Contract Inventories: Opportunities Exist to Improve Agency Reporting and Review Efforts (GAO12-1007), available at www.gao.gov/assets/650/648939.pdf; Industry
Group Asks DOD to Assess Insourcing Costs, 54 GC ¶ 249(d); Slow Data
Collection Risks DOD Contractors Performing Inherently Governmental
Functions, GAO Says, 54 GC ¶ 124 (“Reliance on contractors and delays
implementing an enterprise-wide system to collect relevant contractor
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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information are putting the [DoD] at risk of contractors performing inherently governmental functions[.… For some components,] GAO found
that although DOD has made some incremental progress from FY 2009 to
FY 2010, it has yet to resolve ‘the fundamental issue of how to collect the
required data to meet the legislative inventory requirements, including
manpower data directly from contractors.’”); Contracting Oversight Panel
Compares Public, Private Employee Costs, 54 GC ¶ 103.
IV. BETTER BUYING POWER 2.0: RECALIBRATION OR
REPACKAGING?
On November 13, USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall rolled out DoD’s Better
Buying Power 2.0. See Better Buying Power 2.0 Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/BBP Fact Sheet (13 NOV) Final.pdf, see
also https://dap.dau.mil/bbp. DoD explained (with emphasis added) that:
[BBP] 2.0 reflects [DoD’s] commitment to continuous
improvement. Significant progress has been made since BBP
was first introduced. Affordability analysis is now part of the
standard Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) planning process
to facilitate investment decisions; Should-Cost estimates are
being used as standard practice within the military Services; and
competitive incentive contracts, services acquisitions, and
small business opportunities are receiving greater attention and
focus. Many initiatives that were first introduced will remain,
while a set of new initiatives have been identified and are being
added to address current fiscal realities. The basic goal of BBP
remains: deliver better value to the taxpayer and Warfighter by
improving the way the Department does business.

BBP 2.0 initiatives are organized into seven focus areas:
•

Achieve Affordable Programs

•

Control Costs Throughout the Product Lifecycle

•

Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government

•

Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy

•

Promote Effective Competition

•

Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services

•

Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce

We applaud DoD’s BBP 2.0 for adding “a new focus area to support
and recognize members of the acquisition workforce.” To that end, DoD
articulated initiatives that:
(1) raise standards for key leadership positions;
(2) increase professional qualification requirements;
(3) seek to recognize excellence in acquisition management; and
(4) change culture with an eye towards greater cost consciousness
throughout the acquisition workforce.
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We are less sanguine about some of the other initiatives, although it is
unclear to what extent DoD can simultaneously pursue such a broad range
of initiatives, including:
•

enforcing affordability caps;

•

controlling costs…;

•

incentivizing industry by aligning profitability … with [DoD]
goals and employing appropriate contract types;

•

increasing the effective use of performance-based logistics;

•

reducing cycle times while ensuring sound investment decisions;

•

using the technology development phase for true risk reduction;
and

•

strengthening contract management ….

See also, DOD Rolls Out Second Generation Buying Initiative, 54 GC ¶
358; Government Is Not Leveraging Its Aggregate Buying Power, GAO
Says, 54 GC ¶ 319; Strategic Sourcing: Improved and Expanded Use Could
Save Billions in Annual Procurement Costs, (GAO-12-919) available at
www.gao.gov/assets/650/648644.pdf; DAU Revises Defense Acquisition
Guidebook, 54 GC ¶ 322(a); DOD Releases New Taxonomy for Acquisition
of Services, Supplies and Equipment, 54 GC ¶ 278(d); AT&L Describes
Goals, Challenges, 54 GC ¶ 225(a); Acting USD AT&L Discusses Budget,
Strategic Guidance, 54 GC ¶ 44.
See also, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic &
International Studies, A Case Study for Better Buying Power: Information
Analysis Centers of the Defense Technical Information Center, (April 2012)
(“Realigning and refocusing Information Analysis Center (IAC) capabilities and products on defense system affordability is an essential task for
DoD and Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) leadership going
forward.”), available at http://csis.org. The report offers the following
Tactical Recommendations:
1.

Focus IAC program products on three BBP Initiative elements:
a. Mandating affordability as a requirement,
b. Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry,
c. Promote real competition.

2.

Revise and refocus internal DTIC/IAC program policies, procedures, and products to contribute to several other desired BBP
Initiative outcomes:
a. Identify and address causes of poor tradecraft in services
acquisitions,
b. Eliminate redundancy in warfighter portfolios and reduce
non-productive processes,
c. Identify and suggest alternatives to eliminate/reduce barriers to small business participation.

© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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V.

Acquisition Workforce: STALLED
REPLENISHMENT, LOST MOMENTUM, BLEAK
PROSPECTS

While we were encouraged by Frank Kendall’s efforts to increase the
profile of the acquisition workforce in BPP 2.0, above, it is clear that DoD
no longer intends to fulfill its prior pledge to increase the acquisition
workforce with an infusion of 20,000 new professionals. No one should be
surprised by this harsh reality. See, e.g., Daniel I. Gordon, Feature Comment: Reflections On The Federal Procurement Landscape--Part II, 54 GC
¶ 51 (emphasis added):
Although the progress was limited and the outlook remains
problematic, I believe that we made headway in strengthening
the federal acquisition workforce. ... Despite the investment of
much time on the Hill and the generally supportive reaction we
received from both Republicans and Democrats, in both houses,
we did not get the full $158 million we asked for – but
we nonetheless saw agencies devote more resources to their
acquisition professionals. That pattern repeated itself for FY
2012 as well.
We succeeded in reversing the trend of slashing the numbers
of 1102s, both across DOD and in many (but not all) civilian
agencies. The numbers of 1102s are up, on the order of a 5- to
12-percent increase from a few years earlier. … [Nonetheless],
I am confident that we are not yet at an adequate level.
Moreover, … we must anticipate a large number of retirements
over the next five years.
With the mood on the Hill not favorable to further federal hiring,
I am concerned that we will repeat the mistake of the past
and let the number of 1102s go down again.

See also, generally, Acquisition Workforce Fund Needs Metrics, Distribution
Guidance, 54 GC ¶ 203 (“[DoD] … should issue guidance on the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) to clarify when and
how funds should be collected, distributed and used; establish DAWDF
outcome-based performance metrics; and clearly align DAWDF’s funding strategy with DOD’s strategic human capital plan for the acquisition
workforce..... DOD’s acquisition workforce grew by 17,536 personnel,
from about 118,445 in fiscal year 2009, to 135,981 in December 2011....
Approximately $321 million in DAWDF funding has also been allocated
to increase the … the contract oversight workforce at the [DCAA] and the
[DCMA].”) See also (from after we went to print last year), Acquisition
Workforce Grew In FY 2010, FAI Finds, 54 GC ¶ 61; FAI, FY2010 Annual
Report on the Federal Acquisition Workforce, available at www.fai.gov/
pdfs/FAI_2010_Annual_Report_12_21_11_FINAL.pdf.
VI. THE BIENNIAL PSC SURVEY: MORE OF THE SAME, WITH
A TWIST
One of the more interesting resources last year was the biennail
survey of federal acquisition and procurement professionals, now in its
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sixth iteration. Professional Services Council & Grant Thornton, The
Balancing Act: Acquisition in Unabated Crisis (December 2012), available at http://www.pscouncil.org/. On the one hand, the “2012 findings
reinforce the notion that the more things change, the more they stay the
same.” Not surprisingly, however, last year “budget stability was added
as a top concern[.]” As always, the survey results are thought-provoking.
While this only scratches the surface, some of this survey’s highlights
include:
•

“general[] concern[] about the implications of both ongoing
budget reductions and pending sequestration cuts, regardless
of whether the sweeping cuts come to fruition.”

•

“significant concerns about the state, readiness, size and support
for the acquisition workforce.... [R]eal concern that fiscal realities will place increasing pressure on the acquisition workforce.
The poaching of experienced acquisition resources for better pay
among federal agencies has also … [raised] issues, from loss
of institutional knowledge to unjustified promotions creating
execution risk.”

•

“participants … rate[d] the importance and competency of
their workforce’s ability to obtain the best price, outcome,
modifications and other related aspects of a contract. One
acquisition professional reporting that his office does not use
negotiation at all. ... Nearly two-thirds … cited such skills as
being extremely important, but only one in 10 believe their
acquisition workforce is highly competent in that area, and
more than 25 percent … said the skill is either nonexistent
or in need of improvement.”

•

“resources were overextended in responding to the oversight
community, and that few if any resources were available
to respond. … Acquisition executives reported feeling inhibited about taking reasonable business risks, especially
when it could require additional explanation or reporting
to oversight authorities. … A majority … felt the demand
for oversight was going to increase, even with declining
budgets.”

•

“budget pressures, the increase in risk from oversight activity
and the comparative clarity for decision justifications have all
driven the increases in LPTA as the primary source selection
criteria[.]”

See also, Contractors’ Relationships With COs, Auditors Continue To
Deteriorate, Survey Says, 54 GC ¶ 68 (“The percentage of contractors
that rate their relationships with Government contracting officers
and auditors as fair or poor increased in the last year….. ‘DCAA’s
production-oriented culture has been replaced by a system in which
the DCAA takes far longer to issue lower quality reports,’ Grant
Thornton said.”); http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GT
Com/Government%20contractors/FINAL17thSurveyCoverhighlights
SMALLcomplete.pdf.
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VII. SAYING THE WORDS “Shared SACRIFICE”:
CONTRACTOR FATALITIES bEGIN TO ENTER THE
MAINSTREAM
By the end of 2012, nearly 3,000 contractors had died in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. We continue to be frustrated with the extent to which
these extraordinarily high contractor fatalities (and, more broadly, injuries)
remained almost entirely outside the public’s consciousness. Among other
things, we believe that, in a representative democracy, public awareness
of the human cost of our nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. A
significant body of research suggests that the public is at least somewhat
sensitive to military casualties, and we continue to wonder what impacts,
if any, derive from a significant substitution of contractor deaths for military fatalities. See, generally (long-delayed, but finally in print), Steven L.
Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect
of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, 6 J. of Nat’l Sec. L. &
Pol’y 11 (2012), also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1826242. The
Labor Department continues to earn kudos for transparency for posting
on the Internet the data it generates based upon claims filed under the
Defense Base Act and the War Hazards Compensation Act, which make
contractor employees eligible for worker’s compensation benefits pursuant
to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. See generally
www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm.
Last year provided some progress, particularly in terms of DoD leadership and rhetoric. Frank Kendall, now the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, raised the issue at the Cowen
Group’s 33rd Annual Aerospace/Defense Conference (New York, Feb. 8,
2012):
Terence Hildner … was a brigadier general in the army [who
died in Kabul]. He came back to Dover … on a C17. I went to
Dover for the transfer of the remains. … There’s a dignified
transfer which is a very solemn and kind of heart wrenching for
the families but moving ceremony. . . .
There was one other person on that C-17 and it was a contract
employee of a Canadian firm. After we had done the transfer
for General Hildner, General Austin, myself, General Mason and
the Colonel did the Dignified Transfer for that Canadian citizen
who was a contractor serving with us in Afghanistan.
I find that very symbolic of the service that industry is providing
to us and that you really are part of all this with us. I think that
the respect and the dignity with which we did that and the fact
that we all stayed to do it, sends sort of a message about how we
feel …. It is … a way to say, “Thank you” for that.

See also SIGIR Counts Lives Lost In Iraq Reconstruction, 54 GC ¶
241; Special Report Number 2: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or
Stabilization during Iraqi Freedom, available at www.sigir.mil/files/
lessonslearned/SpecialReport2.pdf. (“Reconstruction or stabilization
operations conducted in combat zones present potentially lethal threats
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to all participants, including military, contractors, U.S. government civilians, third-country nationals, and host country citizens. Planning for such
operations must anticipate this threat…. The human losses suffered in
Iraq (and outlined in this report) underscore the point that when such
operations are conducted in combat zones, they are dangerous for everyone involved, military and civilian, U.S. and non-U.S. alike.…. Poor casualty data management during reconstruction or stabilization operations
obscures the actual human cost of such operations. …Without accurate
records, there cannot be a reasonably complete evaluation of the human
cost of reconstruction or stabilization efforts.”)
Finally, on February 12, 2012, The New York Times became the first
major news outlet to devote a front-page article to the risks facing contractors in the battlespace. Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1 (“This is a war where traditional military jobs,
from mess hall cooks to base guards and convoy drivers, have increasingly
been shifted to the private sector. Many American generals and diplomats
have private contractors for their personal bodyguards. And along with
the risks have come the consequences: More civilian contractors working
for American companies than American soldiers died in Afghanistan last
year for the first time during the war.”). On this issue, we continue to
believe that transparency serves the public’s interest.
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